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ABSTRACT
Self-reporting -- thereporting by parties of their own
behavior to an enforcement authority --isa commonly observed
aspect of law enforcement, as in the context of environmental and
safety regulation. We add self-reporting to the model of the
control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law
enforcement. Optimal self-reporting schemes are characterized
and are shown to offer two advantages over schemes without
self-reporting: enforcement resources are saved because
individuals who are led to report harmful acts need not be
identified; risk is reduced because individuals bear certain
sanctions when they report their behavior, rather than face
uncertain sanctions.
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A commonly observed feature of law enforcement is what we shall call self-
reporting of behavior -- thereporting by parties of their own harm-producing
actions to an enforcement authority. For example, firms frequently report on
their behavior in the context of environmental and safety regulation,
individuals involved in accidents causing injury to others often report this
to the police, and even those who commit crimes sometimes confess their acts
to the authorities. Presumably, parties voluntarily report on their behavior
because they fear more severe treatment if they do not.1
What are the social advantages of self-reporting that may help to explain
its use in law enforcement? More broadly, how does self-reporting fit in the
theory of the control of harmful externalities? The literature on controlling
externalities, dating from Pigou (1918), suggests that activities that create
harm be taxed, but does not emphasize the costs of identifying parties who
cause harm. The more recent literature on law enforcement, however,
investigates the control of harmful activities when it is costly to identify
the parties responsible for causing harm. This literature begins with Becker
(1968), who stresses that, because of these enforcement costs, it is not
socially advantageous to identify those who cause harm all the time, but
rather to do so only with a probability (and to raise the level of sanctions
accordingly).
In this article, we add self-reporting to the model of probabilistic law
enforcement.2 Under a scheme with self-reporting, individuals can be induced
1 To illustrate, under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §9603(b), failure to report the
release of hazardous substances may result in fines or imprisonment, apart
from any penalty associated with the release itself. Also, under the pending
federal criminal sentencing guidelines for organizations, reporting of
violations would lead to substantial reductions in the fines that otherwise
would apply.
2 Self-reporting has not previously been considered in the literature on law
enforcement. However, a number of articles in the mechanism design literature
addressed to risk-sharing contracts, tax collection, regulation, and the
principal-agent model are relevant to our analysis because they examine the
costly auditing of reports. See, in particular, Border and Sobel (1987),to report their harmful acts without materially affecting their incentives
whether or not to commit the acts. This can be accomplished by allowing a
person who reports committing a harmful act to pay a sanction equal to (or
slightly less than) the expected sanction he would face if he did not report
his act. Then, he will be led to report his act, but his willingness to
commit the act will be unchanged. As a consequence, enforcement schemes with
self-reporting offer society two advantages. First, enforcement resources are
saved; because those who commit harmful acts are induced to report their
behavior, enforcement effort need not be spent identifying them. Second,
risk-bearing costs are eliminated (a benefit when actors are risk-averse), for
those who commit harmful acts report their behavior and pay a certain amount.3
By contrast, under law enforcement systems without self-reporting, those who
commit harmful acts bear the risk of sanctions.
Now let us describe the organization of the article. In section 2, we
analyze a model of self-reporting in which risk-neutral individuals choose
whether to commit a single type of harmful act, and in section 3 we examine a
generalization of the model allowing for many types of harmful acts. In these
models, we characterize optimal enforcement schemes with self-reporting and
show how they differ from schemes that do not allow self-reporting. In
particular, we demonstrate that self-reporting schemes are superior to schemes
without self-reporting because the former allow enforcement costs to be
reduced. We also show that a positive level of enforcement is always
desirable with self-reporting, even when it is not necessarily desirable
without self-reporting. In section 4, we consider extensions of our analysis,
allowing for risk aversion, imprisonment as a sanction, error in examination
of behavior, and administrative costs of self-reporting. In section 5, we
offer concluding remarks.
Mookherjee and Png (1989), and Wagenhofer (1987). See also Baiman and Demski
(1980), Baron and Besanko (1984), Dye (1986), Mookherjee and Png (1990),
Reinganum and Wilde (1985), Scotchmer (1987), and Townsend (1979). We comment
on this literature in note 21.
A related advantage is that schemes with self-reporting reduce the need to
impose imprisonment, as we discuss in subsection 4B.
-2-2. The One—Act Model
Risk-neutral individuals choose whether or not to commit an act that
causes a harm h. If an individual commits the harmful act, he obtains a
benefit b E [0, ); b differs among individuals and has positive continuous
density f(.) with cumulative distribution F(). The size of the population
is normalized to one.
We now define and analyze the two schemes of enforcement: enforcement
without self-reporting and enforcement with self-reporting.
A. Enforcement Without Self—Reporting
In the scheme without self-reporting, the social authority examines
individuals with probability p. An examination determines with certainty
whether an individual committed the harmful act, and each examination costs
c.5 Individuals found to have committed the act pay a monetary sanction s,
which is assumed to be socially costless to impose. The maximum level of the
sanction is ,where￿ h; may be interpreted as an individual's wealth.6
The social authority chooses the probability of examination and the sanction
to maximize social welfare, defined as the sum of individuals' benefits minus
the harm due to their acts and examination costs. Socially optimal values of
variables will be denoted by a "*".
Anindividual will commit the harmful act if and only if b S, SO that
social welfare is
The assumption that b has positive density on [0, o)rulesout the
possibility that it is desirable to deter all individuals from committing the
harmful act. If, however, b were distributed on [0, E) and h > ,thenit
would be desirable for no one to commit the harmful act. In this case,
however, complete deterrence may not be optimal (because of the high
enforcement costs that would be required), in which event our analysis and
results would not change.
Other methods of enforcement are discussed in section 5.
6 The assumption that I￿h is used to rule out the corner solution in which
the optimal probability equals one. As explained in note 17, our results do
not depend on this assumption.




The first term is the benefits minus the harm from conunission of the act. The
second term is the enforcement cost, as the entire population (which, recall
is normalized to one) is examined with probability p and each examination
costs c.
The optimal a must be s if p* > OJ Were 5* < s, s could be raised and p
lowered such that ps remained constant. Then the first term in (2.1) would be
unchanged but enforcement costs, pc, would fall; welfare would thus be higher,
contradicting the optimality of s*. (This is the argument of Becker (1968).)




This expression will be negative for all p E [0,1] if c is sufficiently large,
so p* —0is possible. However, p* —1is not possible because the assumption
that h implies that (2.2) is negative at p —1.An interior solution for
p* must satisfy the first-order condition that dW/dp —0.8In this case, the
optimal probability is
(2.3) —h-c/f(p)
and the optimal expected sanction is
(2.4) p*i —h-c/f(pi).
The left side of (2.4) is the social loss from deterring the marginal
individual, because he would have obtained a benefit of p* had he committed
the act. The right side is the net social gain from deterring the marginal
individual, the harm avoided minus the enforcement cost of deterring him.
If p* —0,s* clearly can be taken to equal .
6Here and below, we do not discuss the possibility of multiple optima, as
this does not affect our analysis.
-4-In summary,wehave
Proposition1: When there is no self—reporting:
a. The optimal probability of examination p may be zero.
b. If p* is positive, it is givenbyequation (2.3), and the optimal
Sanction is the maximum feasiblesanctiona.
B. Enforcement With Self—Reporting
In the scheme with self-reporting, individuals have the option of
admitting that they committed the harmful act. If an individual states that
he did so, he pays an ex ante sanction r, where r i,andhe is not
examined. If an individual does not report that he committed the act, he is
treated as he was in the scheme without self-reporting: he is examined with
probability p and, if the examination reveals that he committed the act, he
pays an ex post sanction a.
Individuals who do not commit the harmful act clearly will not report
having done so. Individuals who do commit the act will report this if and
only if rps.10 Hence, individuals commit the act if and only if
b ￿ min(r, ps). There are thus two cases. If r > ps, individuals who commit
the act do not report this, and welfare is as given in (2.1). That is,
enforcement without self-reporting is a special case of enforcement with self-




Expressions (2.5) and (2.1) differ in two respects. First, the lower limit of
integration in (2.5) is r rather than ps, because individuals who commit the
act report this and bear the certain sanction r rather than the expected
sanction ps. Second, the examination cost in (2.5) is pcF(r) rather than pc,
The sanction r is called an ex ante sanction because it is paid before an
individual might be examined. However, in the sequence of events that we
describe, r Is paid after an individual commits the act (although we could as
well imagine r to be paid before an individual commits the act).
As is the convention, we assume that when individuals are indifferent
between reporting the truth and not -- whenr —ps
-- theytell the truth.
-5-because only individuals who do not commit the act (and thus do not report
committing it) --thosewith benefits less than r --areexamined.
We can now make precise the argument sketched in the introduction that
enforcement with self- reporting can induce the same behavior as enforcement
without self-reporting but at lower cost. Let p > 0 and s apply without self-
reporting. With self-reporting, use the same p and s and set r —ps.Then it
is apparent that the same individuals commit the act with self-reporting as
without self-reporting, so the integrals in (2.1) and (2.5) are equal. But
enforcement costs are lower with self-reporting by (I -F(ps))pc,because
those who commit the act and report this are not examined. Thus, we have
Proposition 2: Given any enforcement scheme (involving p >0)without self—
reporting, there exists a scheme with self—reporting under which behavior is
the same but enforcement costs are lower.
The comparison made in this proposition understates the advantage of the
optimal self-reporting scheme over the optimal scheme without self-reporting,
because the optimal probabilities under the two schemes generally differ.
We now characterize the optimal enforcement scheme with self-reporting.
First, the optimum will involve r —ps.If r > ps, individuals who commit the
act would not report this, which proposition 2 implies cannot be optimal. If
r < ps, p could be lowered slightly, maintaining the inequality. Then
individuals who commit the act would continue to report this and pay r, so the
integral in (2.5) would not change, but the reduction in p would reduce the
second term, increasing welfare.' Second, the optimal ex post sanction is s;
as in the case without self-reporting, this sanction economizes on enforcement
resources.
To find the optimum, we now may substitute pi for r in (2.5) and
differentiate with respect to p, to obtain
We have implicitly assumed that p* > 0 in making this argument. But if
—0(a possibility that we rule out below), r can be taken to equal zero





At p —0,the derivative equals hf(0), whichispositive, so that p* must be
positive. In contrast, p* —0was possible without self-reporting if
examination costs were sufficiently high. The reason for the difference is
that, without self-reporting, the entire population needs to be examined, so
that the marginal cost of increasing p is c. With self-reporting, only those
individuals who do not report having committed the act need to be examined,
but there are no such people when p —0(F(r) —0since r —ps—0),so the
marginal enforcement cost at that point is zero. The possibility that p* —1
is again ruled out by the assumption that Ih. Since an interior solution






Equation (2.8) is analogous to (2.4). The left side is the social loss from
deterring the marginal individual (for his benefit from the act is r*, which
equals p*I at the optimum). The right side is the net social gain from
deterring the marginal individual, the harm avoided minus the enforcement cost
of deterring him. The latter has two components in this case: p*c, the
expected cost of examining the marginal individual who, because he has been
deterred, joins the pool of those who do not commit the act and thus might be
examined; cF(p*s)/sf(p*s), the inframarginal cost of examining with a higher
probability those who do not commit the act.
We can interpret r*, which equals p*I in (2.8), as the optimal Pigouvian
tax for committing the harmful act, because this is the amount individuals pay
with certainty when they commit the act (as all who commit the act are induced
to report this and pay r*). The optimal tax is less than the harm •-the
externality is not fully internalized •-dueto enforcement costs.12
12 However, the optimal Pigouvian tax may exceed the harm for some acts in
the n-act model of section 3.
-7-Let us summarize.
PropositiOn 3: When there is self—reporting:
a. In the optimal scheme, all individuals who commit the harmful act report
having acted and no individuals who do not commit the act report having
acted.
b. It is optimal to expend enforcement resources to deter some individuals
from committing the harmful act --theoptimal probability of
examination is positive.
C.Theoptimal probability p is given by equation (2.7), the optimal ex
post sanction is the maximum feasible sanction a, and the optimal cx
ante sanction r* equals p*.
We may now conclude that the optimal self-reporting scheme is superior to
that without self-reporting. Proposition 2 establishes that welfare is higher
with self-reporting than without it for any common positive probability of
enforcement. If p* —0without self-reporting, which is possible, welfare is
obviously equivalent for p —0with self-reporting, but p —0is not optimal
with self-reporting by proposition 3b. Hence, we have Proposition 4: The
optimal self—reporting scheme is superior to the optimal scheme without self—
reporting.
Finally, it is interesting to compare the optimal probabilities of
examination with and without self-reporting, using equations (2.4) and (2.8).
The optimal probabilities generally differ because the costs of deterring the
marginal individual differ. On one hand, this marginal enforcement cost tends
to be lower with self-reporting because an increase in the probability of
examination applies only to deterred individuals. On the other hand, the
marginal enforcement cost tends to be higher with self-reporting because an
increase in the probability enlarges the pool of individuals subject to
examination by deterring more individuals (an effect not present without self-
reporting because all individuals are in the pool in any event). Either of
these tendencies could be dominant, so that the optimal probability with self-
reporting could be either higher or lower than the optimal probability without
self-reporting. 13
-8-3. The N-Act Model
The model of section 2 can be generalized as follows. There are n harmful
acts, where act I causes harm of h1, 0 <h1<... <h.The population is
divided into groups of size 8; individuals in group I choose between not
acting and committing the act that causes harm (For convenience, not
acting is sometimes referred to as committing act 0.) Otherwise, the
assumptions are as before: individuals obtain a benefit b if they commit a
harmful act, where b is distributed according to f(); examinations cost C;
the maximum feasible sanction is ih.
A. Enforcement Without Self—Reporting
Because an individual in group i will commit a harmful act if and only if









Assume that p* > 0. It then follows from (3.2) that the optimum is
Sj* —h/p*if this is feasible --thatis, if hj/p* .Otherwise,s* —s.
In other words, optimal sanctions rise with the level of harm and lead to
first-best behavior (individuals commit harmful acts if and only if their
benefit exceeds the harm) until the maximum feasible sanction is reached; any




The numerator obviously can be positive or negative. (It will be positive,
implying that the optimal probability with self-reporting will be higher, if c
is large enough relative toor h is low enough -- conditionsindicating that
in schemes with and without self-reporting it is optimal to deter only a small
fraction of the population.)
14 At the end of this section, we consider the case in which each individual
may choose any of the n acts.
-9-acts subject to this sanction are underdeterred. Let I denote the set of j




Thus, as in the one-act model, the optimum involves p* —0if c is
sufficiently large. If p* is positive. (3.3) is zero. In this case, the set
I cannot be empty (it must include n), for otherwise (3.3) is negative. We
now can state the following analog of proposition I.
Proposition 5: When there is no self—reporting in the n—act model:
a. The optimal probability of examination p* may be zero.
b. If p is positive, its level is determined by setting (3.3) equal to
zero, and the optimal sanction s for acts of type i is h/p* if this
is feasible and is the maximum feasible sanction a otherwise.
B. Enforcement With Self-Reporting
Now suppose that individuals must report a type of act: a number in the
set (0, 1 n}. Individuals who report i pay an ex ante sanction r1; they
are then examined with probability j and, if examined, pay an ex post
sanction Sjj, where j is their true act. The maximum amount that an
individual may be sanctioned, r + s, is ,andall sanctions are
nonnegative.15 The social authority chooses an enforcement mechanism -aset
of r, p, and sU --tomaximize social welfare.
In an appendix, we indicate why the revelation principle applies, so
attention may be confined to mechanisms in which individuals who commit act I
truthfully report i. We then use the fact that the optimal scheme induces
truth-telling at minimum enforcement cost to establish several results.
First, the optimal ex post sanctions involve the maximal penalty for lying and
no penalty for telling the truth. That is,
15 The analysis in the appendix demonstrating that 5jj* and r0* equal zero
suggests that welfare could be further increased if negative sanctions --
rewards-- fortelling the truth and for not doing harm were permitted
(contrary to actual practice). However, if we allowed for rewards of up to
some limit, as did Border and Sobel (1987). our results would not change.
(Mookherjee and Png (1989) impose no such constraint and use the assumption of
risk aversion to limit the optimal size of rewards.)
-10-(3.4) SU*
—I - r,for ij, and
(3.5) Sjj*
—0.
Also, those who report not having acted are not sanctioned, so
(3.6) r0* —0.





wheredenotes the highest of the r. It follows from (3.7) that if rj —
thenPt —0;also, if r1 > rj, then P <
Because individuals report the truth and, when doing so, bear only the ex
ante sanction, their (expected) sanction for committing act I Is simply rt.
Thus, an Individual in group i commits act i if and only if b ￿:r,so social
welfare can be written





Note that the second expression in brackets measures examination costs: the
fraction I -F(r)of group I commit act I and report I, so they are examined
with probability pj; the remaining fraction of group i do not commit act I, so
they report 0 and are examined with probability P.
We now prove the analog of proposition 2, that any behavior resulting
under a scheme without self-reporting can be induced with self-reporting at a
lower enforcement cost. Let p >0and st (I —1,...,n) apply without self-
reporting. With self-reporting, set r —Sjandr0 —0;also, set the s as
in (3.4) and (3.5) and the Pt as in (3.7). The decision whether to commit
acts will be the same as it was without self-reporting (as rj —psj),so the
integrals in (3.1) and (3.8) will be equal. To compare enforcement costs,
observe from (3.7) that, with self-reporting, for all I, Pt Po —r/s
Moreover,r —psjfor some j, so p — i/I.Therefore,pPt for all I,
-11-and p1 < p for all I > 0 such that s > Ø•16 Thus, the enforcement cost term
in (3.8) is strictly less than that in (3.1) (because only the undeterred are
examined with the highest probability rather than the entire population).
This establishes Proposition 6: In the n—act model, given any enforcement
scheme (involving p > 0) without self—reporting, there exists a scheme with
self—reporting under which behavior is the same but enforcement costs are
lower.
At this point, we can determine the optimal ex ante sanctions by







2] I (s -r1)
The first term in brackets in (3.9) is the direct social benefit from
deterring the marginal individual in group i from committing act i: harm of h1
is avoided, but his benefits of rj are lost (the marginal individual's benefit
equals the sanction r1). The remainder of the expression is the change in
examination costs. The first component is a cost arising because individuals
who are deterred are examined at rate Po rather than at rate p (and (3.7)
Implies Po > p for r1 > 0 because r0* —0).The second component is a benefit
arising because those who commit act I (the fraction 1 -F(r1)of group i) are
examined less frequently (from (3.7), the optimal Pj falls as r1 rises'7).
Because these two components are of opposite sign, h1 r may be positive or
negative at an interior optimum, when dW/dr —0.18Thus, rj* may be such that
16 If s —0for all i, r —0,which implies p —0,for all I, so the result
that enforcement costs can be lowered with self-reportin follows trivially.
This follows because the numerator of the derivative of (3.7) with respect
to r is r - whichis negative since we assume that h1 and demonstrate
below that r* < h. Without our assumption, the numerator could equal zero --
thatis, r* —sis possible. (If c is sufficiently small and s < h, dW/dr in
(3.11) can be positive at r —
Itshould be noted that if i*— i, thenj* —1for all_i such that
r* < r* (see (3.7)). In this case, ri* —hfor all h < r*.(In (3.9),
Po —Piand r —s,so dW/dr —01(h1
.r1)f(r1).)Also, our results concerning
the relationship among the r* and the advantage of self-reporting (those
subject to r need not be examined) would hold.
12 -there is either underdeterrence or overdeterrence relative to first-best
behavior.
Using (3.9), we can show that r* > 0 for any r1* < * (other than r0*),
because dW/dr at rj —0is positive. Specifically, the first term in
brackets is hf(0), which is positive; the first component of the second term
is zero (for, from (3.7), pj —pat r1 —0);the second component of the
second term is positive. The explanation is that increasing rj from 0 has
deterrence benefits and reduces the rate at which individuals of type i must
be examined.
It also follows from (3.9) that, for any rj* and rj* (other than r0*) less
than j*,
(3.10) h > h *r*> rj*.
That is, the ex ante sanction (which, after all, equals the expected sanction)
increases with the harm for those not subject to the highest sanction. The
proof is in the appendix.
We now determine the optimal level of .LetJ be the set of positive j
such that rj —. Then,varyingfor all j E J, we obtain19
Because the first component is a marginal effect and the second an
inframarginal effect, the relationship of the two will depend, among other
things, on the shape of the distribution f(.). It can be demonstrated that
there exist parameters and distributions consistent with our assumptions such
that either component may dominate at the optimum.





which is what is obtained in the one-act model by differentiating W in (2.5)
with respect to r, using the relationship r —pi.(To facilitate the
comparison to a scheme without self-reporting, we had differentiated W with
respect to p rather than r in the one-act model.)











The summation in (3.11) over jEJ has an interpretation similar to that of
(3.9), except for the last component: in (3.9), those who commit the act (the
fraction 1 -F(r1))are examined at a lower rate because p falls as r
increases; in (3.11). those who are deterred (the fraction F() of group j)
must be examined at a higher rate, because Po increases as r increases. The
summation over the iJ is the cost of examining individuals not subject to
more frequently (from (3.7), all the pj, including Po' rise with ). Observe
that all the terms except the first component of the first summation,
(h -)f(j),are negative. Thus, if dW/d —0at the optimum, the sum over
j €J of the first components must be positive; that is, on average, there must
be underdeterrence of individuals subject to the highest sanction. It need
not be the case, however, that all acts subject to are underdeterred at the
optimum.2°
Now let us show that some degree of enforcement is optimal -- thatis,
r* >0.Suppose that r —0,so that J —(1 n), and consider raising all
the r (except r0) uniformly. Evaluating the expression for marginal welfare




Thus, i* >0.From (3.7), this implies p0* >0,so some enforcement effort is
applied at the optimum. The reason is essentially that given for proposition
3b in section 2: when the sanctions r for all the acts are raised
20 For an overdeterred act,say act k, to be subject to r at the optimum, it
must be that dW/drk in (3.9) is positive when evaluated at r. This
possibility cannot be ruled out. Although overdeterrence implies that the
first term in (3.9) is negative and (3.7) implies that the second term is
negative (p —0at rk —i),the third term is positive.
-14-simultaneously from zero, there is a first-order social benefit due to
deterrence, but no first-order examination cost is borne because no one is
being examined.
Last, we prove in the appendix that the acts subject to the largest cx
ante sanction, i*,arethe most harmful acts --thatis, if r* <r*—
thenh1 < h1.
Our results about the optimal self-reporting mechanism are summarized in
the following two propositions.2'
Proposition 7: Under the optimal self-reporting scheme in the n—act model, the
following hold:
a. Allindividualsreport their behavior truthfully.
b. Individuals who commit act i pay a certain cx ante sanction rj* and no
more, for there is no cx post sanction for having told the truth ——
Bjj*0; also, the cx post sanction for lying can be taken to be
maximal —— a—r1for ij.
c.Some individuals are deterred from committing each of the harmfulacts.
i. The cx ante sanction is positive for all harmful acts and zero for
not committing a harmful act; the rj* rise with the level of harm
until reaching a maximum r* at some h and are r* thereafter ——
o — r0*<r1<... < rf—... r—r*;r* and the lesser r*
are determined by setting (3.11) and (3.9) respectively equal to
zero.
ii. The most harmful act is underdeterred relative to first—best
behavior ——r*<h;other acts may be underdeterred or
overdeterred, although acts subject to the highest cx ante
sanction r* are underdeterred on average.
d. The probability of examination is highest for those who report not
having committed a harmful act; for those who report having committed
harmful acts, the p fall with the level of harm until reaching zero
for the most harmful acts (those subject to the highest cx ante sanction
r) ——p0*> > ...>p,* ...p*=0;the p' are given by (3.7).
Proposition 8: In the n-act model, the optimal self-reporting scheme is
superior to the optimal scheme without self—reporting.
Observe that proposition 7 justifies implicit assumptions made in the one-
act model in section 2. There we assumed that those who commit the harmful
act (which is trivially the most harmful act) are not examined, those who do
21 In the mechanism design literature on auditing cited in note 2, it also
generally is true that efficient auditing involves maximal penalties for
lying, no penalties for telling the truth, and greater audit probabilities for
reports associated with lower payments, But our characterization of the
optimal r and their relationship to the h (as well as our extensions in
section 4) are not in the auditing literature, because our model is addressed
to the optimal control of harmful externalities.
15 -not report having committed the act pay no ex ante sanction, and those who
truthfully report not having committed the act bear no ex post sanction.
Proposition 7 states that each of these restrictions on the enforcement
mechanism is in fact a feature of the optimal mechanism.
Finally, let us consider theconsequencesof relaxing the assumption that
each individual chooses between committing one harmful act and not acting.
Instead we can allow individuals to choose among any of the n harmful acts or
not acting, which presents the issue of marginal deterrence.22 In this case,
an individual will choose the act for which the excess of the benefit over the
expected sanction is largest, unless the net benefit of that act is negative.
in which event he will not commit a harmful act.23 In the appendix, we sketch
the argument establishing that our results continue to hold in the case of
marginal deterrence, except that the first-order conditions determining the
optimal rj must be modified.
4,.Extensions
In this section, we discuss a number of extensions of our analysis,
illustrating them in the one-act model for convenience.
A. Risk Aversion
As we suggested at the outset, an important feature of self-reporting
schemes is that individuals need not bear any risk of sanctions: they can be
induced to report their true behavior and pay sanctions with certainty.
Without self-reporting, by contrast, individuals who commit harmful acts must
bear the risk of sanctions, which is socially costly if individuals are risk-
averse.
22Stigler(1970) chose the term marginal deterrence because an individual's
choice between two harmful acts depends on the difference, or margin, between
expected sanctions for the two acts.
23Specifically,an individual is assumed to obtain a benefit b1 if he
commits act 1., where the b are independently and identically distributed
according to the previously described density f(.). Thus, individuals choose
the act i that maximizes b1 -rj,unlessthis maximum is negative.
-16-To elaborate, we modify the one-act model to incorporate risk aversion.
Assume that an individual's utility consists of three separable components: a
strictly concave function u() of his net wealth, plus the benefit of
committing the harmful act if it is committed, minus the harm suffered due to
other individuals committing the harmful act.24 An individual's net wealth is
his initial wealth, w, minus any sanctions paid and a lump-sum tax t equal to
net per capita enforcement expenses (examination costs minus fine revenue).
Social welfare is the sum of individuals' expected utilities.
If there is no self-reporting, individuals will commit the harmful act if
and only if
(4.1) (l-p)u(w -t)+ pu(w -t-s)+ b ￿ u(w -t).
Let p(p,s) be the certainty equivalent of being subject to a sanction of s
with probability p. Individuals will thus commit the harmful act if and only
if
(4.2) b u(w -t)-u(w-t-p(p,s)).
Define the right side of (4.2) as fl(p). The enforcement authority's problem
is to maximize social welfare





If there is self-reporting, individuals who commit the harmful act and
report this obtain utility (abstracting from harm suffered) of
24 The relevance of the assumption that the benefit is additively separable
is explained in note 25.
-17-(4.4) u(w -t-r)+ b,
and those who commit the act but do not report it obtain utility of
(4.5) (l-p)u(w -t)+ pu(w -t-s)+ b.
Thus, an individual who commits the harmful act will report it when25
(4.6) u(w -t-r)￿ (l-p)u(w -t)+ pu(w -t-s).
We assume that (4.6) applies --thatindividuals who commit the act are
induced to report it. Otherwise, as in section 2, the situation is as if
there is no self-reporting. Moreover, at the optimum (4.6) holds as an
equality: if not, as before, p could be lowered, maintaining (4.6) and thus
individuals' behavior, but reducing enforcement costs. Let r(p,s) denote the
r that makes (4.6) an equality given p and s. Individuals consequently will
commit the harmful act if and only if
(4.7) b ￿ u(w -t)
-u(w-t-r(p,s)).
Define the right side of this expression to be fl(r). The problem is to
maximize social welfare
(4.8) W —5 [u(w




We can demonstrate that self-reporting schemes are superior to schemes
without self-reporting by comparing expressions (4.8) and (4.3) for any
positive p and a. Let us evaluate both expressions at the t given in (4.3).
Note that (4.6) does not depend on b. If we had assumed that b were
included in wealth, rather than entering utility in an additively separable
manner, then whether individuals report acts would generally depend on b
because the certainty equivalent of the ex post sanction depends on total
wealth. Self-reporting would, however, remain advantageous as long as some
individuals would report their acts under the optimal scheme.
-18-Observe first that p(p,s) in (4.3) must equal r(p,s) in (4.8), because each
measures the certainty equivalent of being subject to sanction s with
probability p, while initial net wealth, w -t,is the same in each case. As
a result, the values of expressions (4.3) and (4.8) are the same. Second, let
us show that the t in (4.3) --whichby assumption makes the government break
even without self-reporting --producesa surplus with self-reporting. This
will mean that achievable welfare must be higher with self-reporting.26 The
government will be in surplus for two reasons, as is evident from comparing
the expressions for t in (4.3) and (4.8). First, enforcement costs with self-
reporting are pcF(fi) rather than pc; this savings, due to examining only those
who do not report having committed the act, is that identified in the risk-
neutral case. Second, revenues from payments of sanctions are r(l -F(fl))
rather than ps(l -F()),because those who are not deterred pay r for certain
rather than ps on average. And r > ps: r -PSis the risk premium for
avoiding exposure to s with probability p (see (4.6)). The increase in
revenue from sanctions reflects the social benefit of eliminating risk under
self-reporting.
It can be demonstrated that our other results continue to hold when
individuals are risk-averse (although the characterizations of the optimal
probability and ex ante sanctions differ because the certainty equivalent of
sanctions rather than their expected value determines behavior).
Specifically, with self-reporting, the optimum involves all individuals
reporting truthfully, and optimal enforcement effort is positive.2'
26 With the surplus, t can be reduced and welfare raised (even though
behavior might change due to wealth effects, requiring an offsetting increase
in p to keep behavior constant).
27 When r —0,individuals all have wealth equal to w and thus equal marginal
utilities of wealth, so raising r has no distributive effects, while, as in
the risk-neutral case, it produces first-order benefits from deterrence but no
first-order examination costs. Formally,
—hfl'f()-[(l-F())u+ F(fl)u15]((pc + r)'f() +
-(uk
-u')F()(l-F(fl)),
where u' and u1 denote the marginal utility of wealth for those who act and
those wio do not act. When r —0,the second and third terms are both zero,
and the first term is positive.
-19-Achievable welfare is greater with self-reporting than without it, but now
there are two reasons: reduction of enforcement costs and elimination of risk-
bearing costs. Finally, because no risk is borne, the optimal ex post
sanction is(as it was in section 2). In contrast, without self-reporting
the optimal enforcement scheme may change substantially because of risk
aversion; in particular, the optimal sanction may be less than maximal.28
B. Imprisonment as a Sanction
Suppose that imprisonment, a socially costly sanction, may be employed as
a supplement to monetary sanctions, which we have assumed to be socially
costless to impose when individuals are risk-neutral (as we assume is true in
this subsection). Then schemes with self-reporting have the additional
advantage that society can enjoy the deterrence benefits of imprisonment
without imposing any imprisonment or imposing it to a lesser extent than in
schemes without self-reporting.
Let us demonstrate this advantage in the one-act model. Denote the ex
post monetary sanction by s1, where s (the maximum monetary sanction,
perhaps equal to wealth), and the ex post sanction of imprisonment by 2,
wheres2s2 (the maximum term of imprisonment). The disutility of sanctions
to individuals is s, where s —s1+s2;the social cost of imposing 2iss2,
where r >0.Observe that it is desirable for society to employ monetary
sanctions to their limit ibeforeresort to imprisonment: otherwise, s2 could
be lowered and s raised, keeping s (and thus behavior) the same but reducing
the social costs of using imprisonment.
Now assume that, without self-reporting, imprisonment is employed
probabilistically --thatis, s —+ s2,where s2 >0,and 0 <p<1.With
self-reporting, choose r —ps.As before, individuals' behavior will be the
same as without self-reporting and there will be the usual advantage of
conserving on examination costs, because those who commit the harmful act are
induced to report this and are not examined. Now, however, there is the
further advantage of reducing the use of imprisonment. Specifically, define
See Polinsky and Shavell (1979).
20 -r1 and r2 as the ex ante monetary sanction and the ex ante term of
imprisonment, respectively.Then, r —pa isequivalentto r1.tr2—
+ s2).If r ￿, setr1 —rand r2 —0; hence, there is no imprisonment,
producinga savingsofP72If r >s, setr1 —s1and r2 —p(s1+ -
then the savingsin imprisonment costs is (l-p)ts1. The advantage of self-
reporting inthis latter case is that s1 is imposed with certainty rather than
onlywith probability p.so that the use of imprisonment isdiminished by
(l-p)i'.
The idea underlying the above argument may be expressed informally as
follows. With self-reporting, the ex ante sanctions that are actually imposed
are lower in magnitude by a factor of p than those that are necessary to
impose ex post without self-reporting. because costless monetary sanctions
are used before imprisonment, this reduction in the magnitude of imposed
sanctions with self-reporting allows society to reduce or eliminate the actual
imposition of imprisonment.
The conclusion that imprisonment costs can be saved with self-reporting is
relevant whenever imprisonment would be desirable to impose without self-
reporting. But even when imprisonment would not be desirable to employ
withoutself-reporting, the threat of imprisonment as an ex postsanction for
thosewho fail to report their harmful acts always enhances theadvantages of
self-reporting schemes. A given level of deterrence --agiven ex ante
sanction r --canbe achieved more cheaply, with a lower probability of
examination, because those who would report falsely face a greater ex post
sanction than otherwise. Furthermore, because ex post sanctions are never
actually imposed, no social costs of imprisonment are incurred.
C. Errors in Examinations
Weassumed throughout that individuals'truebehavior would be accurately
determinedin examinations by the enforcement authority. Suppose instead that
their behavior is sometimes assessed erroneously. This will decrease
achievable welfare in schemes with and without self-reporting, but (perhaps
surprisingly) will increase the relative advantage of self-reporting schemes.
-21 -Assume that if a person does not commit the harmful act and is examined,
he will mistakenly be found to have committed the act with probability q1; if
he cointsits the harmful act and is examined, he will erroneously be found not
to have committed the act with probability q0.
Without self-reporting, an individual who does not commit the harmful act
bears an expected sanction of pq1s rather than zero, and a person who does
commit the act bears an expected sanction of p(l-q0)s rather than ps. Thus,
individuals will commit the act if and only If
(4.9) b ps(l-q0-q1).
Now let us demonstrate that with self-reporting the same behavior can be
achieved as without self-reporting, but at lower enforcement cost. Keep p and
s at the same levels as without self-reporting and set r —p(l-q0)s.If a
person commits the harmful act and does not report it, the expected sanction
will be p(l-q0)s, so he will report it; if he does not commit the act, the
expected sanction will be pq1s. Thus, individuals will commit the harmful act
if and only if (4.9) holds, the same condition as without self-reporting.
Although behavior is the same under both schemes, enforcement costs with self-
reporting are lower by (1 -F(ps(l-q0-q1)))pc,because those who commit the
act are not examined. Moreover, observe from (4.9) that as the magnitude of
errors coandq increases, the level of p necessary to achieve a given level
of deterrence increases vith and without self-reporting (by the same amount),
so achievable welfare is reduced in both schemes. Also, the savings in
enforcement costs under self-reporting are greater: the benefit from not
examining those who report committing the act rises when p must be increased
on account of error to maintain deterrence.
Because individuals who truthfully report not having committed the harmful
act might mistakenly be deemed to have committed it, the imposition of ex post
sanctions is not entirely avoided under self-reporting. Consequently, when
individuals are risk-averse or imprisonment is used, social costs associated
with the ex post imposition of sanctions are incurred, and it may be optimal
to adjust the enforcement scheme, as by lowering sanctions. But the
-22-advantages of self-reporting with regard to saving risk-bearing costs and
imprisonment Costs are still present. Consider a given p and s. Individuals
who do not commit the harmful act are in the same situation with and without
self-reporting: they are exposed to the same chance of bearing ex post
sanctions through error. But individuals who commit the act are subject to cx
post sanctions only when there is no self-reporting; with self-reporting, such
individuals report committing the act and are subject to ex ante sanctions
alone. Thus, schemes with self-reporting continue to have the benefit of
reducing sanctioning costs for those who commit harmful acts. Moreover, to
achieve a given level of deterrence, greater sanctioning costs must be imposed
on those who commit harmful acts when errors sometimes are made, so this
advantage of self-reporting is enhanced.
D. Administrative Costs of Self—Reporting
We assumed in the model that the only social costs associated with
enforcement were the costs of examining individuals' behavior. However.
processing reports and collecting payments involves administrative costs.
This is a disadvantage of self-reporting because, when an individual reports
his behavior and pays a sanction, society bears administrative costs with
certainty, whereas without self-reporting society bears administrative costs
only with a probability.
To illustrate, assume that collecting a positive payment, whether ex ante
or ex post, involves a fixed administrative cost d. Without self-reporting,
the level of social welfare previously given by expression (2.1) is reduced by
pd(l -F(ps)),since only those who commit the harmful act and are examined
make payments. With self-reporting, the level of welfare previously given by
(2.5) is reduced by d(l -F(r)),because those who commit the act make
payments with certainty. Thus, the argument of proposition 2 --thatthe same
behavior can be induced with self-reporting as without it but at lower social
cost --mayno longer hold. If r is set equal to ps, the same behavior is
produced under self-reporting, but the savings in enforcement and
administrative costs is now
-23-(4.10) (1 -F(r))(pc (l-p)d).
The savings depends on the fraction of the population who commit the act and
report this under self-reporting, I -F(r),because individuals who do not
commit the act are subject to the same treatment under both schemes. For
those who commit the act, self-reporting schemes save pc because examinations
need not be conducted for those who commit the act, whereas examinations
otherwise would be conducted with probability p at unit cost c. But self-
reporting schemes involve the additional cost (l-p)d because payments must be
collected at unit cost d from those who would not have been examined without
self-reporting (the fraction l-p). Jhether self-reporting remains preferable
depends on whether c and p are sufficiently large relative to d.2
5. Concluding Remarks
Methods of Enforcement. Our analysis demonstrated that enforcement costs
could be saved when enforcement took the form of examination, by which we
meant that the enforcement authority randomly selected individuals and
determined whether they committed the harmful act. We briefly discuss here
two other methods of enforcement.
First, consider investigation -- determiningwho committed a particular
harmful act that the enforcement authority already knows occurred. This type
of enforcement is typical in the area of crime, where victims often inform the
police of harms that they have suffered. (By contrast, examination is used in
areas such as environmental regulation, where the occurrence of harmful acts
may not be immediately apparent and later attempts to trace harm to particular
sources may be impossible.)
29Inthe n-act model, it may not be optimal to have individuals report and
pay positive cx ante sanctions for acts whose harm is below some threshold
(because raising rj from zero requires that the administrative cost of
reporting be incurred). These acts would be subject only to cx post sanctions
(set to optimize deterrence, as when there is no self-reporting).
24 -When enforcement is by investigation, self-reporting does not merely
reduce enforcement costs, it eliminates them: once someone confesses, others
need not be investigated. (In our model, by comparison, one person's
admission that he committed a harmful act does not rule out the possibility
that others may also have committed harmful acts.) To realize this savings in
enforcement costs, individuals must be induced to admit committing harmful
acts, and (as in our model) this can best be accomplished by setting the ex
ante sanction for those who admit committing harmful acts equal to the
expected ex post sanction. Thus, the reduction in the sanction for admitting
one's act should be greater the lower would have been the probability of
apprehending the person through investigation.30 Accordingly, if a person
confesses when the police have little evidence (such as immediately after a
crime is committed), the reduction in his sanction should be large, but if a
person confesses when the police have already gathered substantial evidence
against him, the reduction should be small.
Second, consider monitoring -- theposting of enforcement agents to
observe violations among any of a population of parties, as when police are
stationed at the roadside. Monitoring is useful when a single agent is
readily able to spot any violations that occur within sight of his post.
(Monitoring is not enough, and examination or investigation is necessary, when
extra effort is required to detect any particular individual's violation.)
When monitoring is the method of enforcement, there may be no cost savings
achievable under self-reporting. For example, even if individuals who wish to
speed or make illegal left turns were to report this in advance to the police,
there would be little if any reduction in the number of officers that would
have to be posted in order to maintain the probability of apprehension for
other drivers who might commit violations.
Why Individuals Night Not Report Truthfully. In the model (as well as in
the extensions of it), individuals report truthfully given socially optimal
enforcement. We do not, however, observe all individuals reporting the truth.
30Thenecessary reduction is s -r—s-ps—s(l-p).
-25-There are two plausible explanations for this. First, the perceived or actual
expected sanctions for failing to report or lying may be relatively low for
certain individuals. While examination rates could be increased in an attempt
to induce these individuals to report truthfully, this would be costly. And
to the extent that individuals are not induced to report the truth, the
savings in examination costs and the reduction in risk-bearing and in the use
of imprisonment will be lower.
Second, some individuals may not be aware of the nature of the act that
they have committed. The social authority could attempt to remedy this
problem by adjusting the enforcement mechanism to increase the expected cost
of false reports, thereby inducing uninformed individuals to acquire
information so that they could report truthfully. This, however, would be
costly. Also, it may not be desirable, because the savings in examination
costs (incurred probabilistically) when such individuals report the truth may
be less than individuals' information acquisition costs (incurred ex ante,
with certainty).
The Use of Self—Reporting. That self-reporting is a frequently observed
feature of law enforcement is consistent with our analysis, for it seems that
in many contexts significant enforcement resources or costs of imposing
sanctions can be saved by inducing people to come forward with information
about their conduct. At the same time, it is not surprising that self
reporting is not observed in some instances. With regard to the example of
driving violations (like Improper left turns) that are not reported by those
who commit them, two of the limitations of self-reporting are relevant. The
administrative cost of processing reports of many types of driving violations
would be large relative to the expected harm they cause, and the number of
police necessary to maintain a given level of deterrence would not be much
reduced if some violations were reported.
It does not appear, however, that the benefits of self-reporting are fully
realized in practice. Notably, the incentives to report one's conduct
frequently seem weak, as the reduction in penalties for parties who admit
harmful behavior Is often modest even when the probability of punishment for
-26-those not reporting their violations is substantially less than one. When
this is the case, increasing incentives for reporting harmful acts would
induce more reporting and raise welfare.
Finally, we should remark that although our discussion throughout has
focused on public enforcement of law, it is more broadly relevant, to
enforcement through private suit and to enforcement of incentive schemes in
private contractual arrangements. For example, employers may have a policy of
treating more favorably employees who admit to drug use or pilferage than
employees who are found out. Inducing employees to report their own
misconductreduces the employer's need to police employee behavior and also
the need to impose costly sanctions (such as dismissal).
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-28-</ref_section>Appendix
Proof of Proposition 7
Here we prove the claims of proposition 7 that are not demonstrated in the
text.
First, we observe that an individual who chooses act i and reports j bears
an expected sanction of rj +pjs,so he will report j(i), the report that
minimizes the expected sanction for those who commit act I. Therefore, an
individual in group i will commit act I rather than not act (commit act 0) ii
and only if
(A.l) b(rjj+pj(j)Sj(j)j) — (rj(o)+Pj(o)(o)O)
The socially optimal mechanism can be assumed to be such that individuals
report their acts truthfully. In other words, the revelation principle
applies, even though individuals report only their acts, not their underlying
types.31 To explain (we omit details), suppose that an optimal mechanism
involves an individual choosing act I but reporting j different from i. Then
it must be that any other individual who chooses act I also reports j, for an
individual will select the report that minimizes his expected sanction, and
this report depends only on one's act because expected sanctions depend only
on one's act and report. Now, alter the mechanism by relabeling j as i -- so
that the treatment of a person who reports i is exactly what it had been under
the original mechanism when he reported j. This altered mechanism will induce
anyone who commits act i to report truthfully. Moreover, anyone who commits
act I will be subject to the same expected sanction, so his behavior will be
unchanged. By this method, we generally can construct a mechanism that is
equivalent to the original one but which involves truthful reporting.
31Weassume that individuals do not report their benefits. A justification
is that verifying an Individual's benefit would be prohibitively costly in
many contexts.
-Al-Because we may assume reports are truthful, the following incentive
compatibility constraints, denoted by ICu, must hold for all i and j:
(A.2) r + j5jjr, + pjs,
This constraint requires that the expected sanction if a person commits act I
and tells the truth does not exceed the expected sanction if he reports j
instead.
We now demonstrate equation (3.4), which states that sU* —s-rj,for
i 0 j. If (3.4) did not hold, one could alter the mechanism by raising s1 to
the point where (3.4) does hold. Since IC is satisfied under the original
mechanism, it would satisfied under the altered mechanism, as the right side
of IC would be greater and the left side would be unaffected. Moreover,
individuals' choices of acts would be unaffected by raising any s, because
no individual would bear sti, as all would report truthfully. Thus, social
welfare under the altered mechanism would be the same as under the original
one.
Next, we show (3.5), that s* —0.If (3.5) did not hold, one could
alter the mechanism by lowering Sjj to 0 and raising rj by PjSj. This
alteration would not affect IC: the left side would have the same value, and
the right side would be unaffected. For the IC, j o I, however, a higher r1
would increase the right side while the left side would be unaffected, so pj
could be lowered, which would reduce enforcement costs.32 Finally, since the
expected sanction for telling the truth under this altered mechanism would be
the same as under the original mechanism, individuals' choices of acts would
be unaffected. Thus, social welfare would be higher under the altered
mechanism.
These two simplifications allow IC in (A.2) to be rewritten as33
32 Ifp in the optimal mechanism were zero, the argument in the text would
not hold. But the level of s would not affect behavior, so s could be
taken to be zero.
Note that (A.3) holds trivially if i —j.
-A2-(A.3) rj -rj￿pj(s ri).
Thatis, any savings in the ex ante sanction gained by reporting j rather than
the true act i cannot exceed the expected ex post sanction for lying.
Using (A.3), we can establish (3.6), that r0* —0.First, we show that
the lowest of the r, which we denote r, must equal zero. If r >0,one could
alter the mechanism by reducing each of the r1 by r and raising the s, for
ij, as indicated by (3.4). This change would not affect the left side of
IC in (A.3) and would raise the right side, so the ICj would continue to
hold. Moreover, each of the IC could be satisfied with lower p, so
enforcement costs could be reduced. Finally, it is apparent from (A.l) (which
reduces to b r1 -r0)that individuals' choices of acts would be unaffected,
so welfare would be higher under the altered mechanism. Second, r0* —r.If
not, r —0for some k > 0, since r —0.LetK —(kirk —0)and alter the
mechanism by increasing all the rk,kEK,by the same small amount -- in
particular small enough that r5 < rmfor all inK (including in—0).The
constraints IC will continue to hold.(If iK, the increase in rk will
relax the constraint, and if i E K the constraint will still be satisfied
because the left side equals zero and the right side is nonnegative.) The
constraints ICwillcontinue to hold as well. (The left side will be
negative if jK and zero otherwise.) Finally, increasing the rk will not
affect behavior: rk -r0is negative before and after the alteration, so all
individuals in group k, for kK,commit theiractregardless. Thus, if
r0 > 0, the optimal r need not equal zero, a contradiction.
Next, let us demonstrate that the incentive compatibility constraints lC1
are binding for reports of acts subject toand for no others --thatis,
IC is binding if and only if r —. First,the constraints for reports not
subject toare not binding. This is apparent from (A,3): the left side is
greater the greater is r and the right side is independent of rj, so the
constraint can be binding only if rj —r.To prove that the constraints are
binding for reports subject to ,supposeinstead that -r<pj(S
-r)for
some j. Alter the mechanism by lowering pj such that this inequality
-A3-continues to hold. The constraint IC in (A.3) will continue to hold for all
i. Also, this reduction in does not alter individuals' choices of acts (as
the r are the same). But reducing pj saves enforcement costs, so welfare is
higher. Because the constraints (A.3) are binding when r —r,the optimal
probabilities are given by (3.7).
Finally, we demonstrate the relationships between the h and the optimal
r. First, we prove (3.10), that for any rA* and rà* (other than r0*) less
than r*, h1 >himplies rj*>rj*.Observe that for any positive constant A,
the function AW is maximized at the same r as is W. In particular, (l/)W
is maximized at r1* and (l/D)W is maximized at rj*. Now, using (3.9), for
any r E[0,j], (l/B1)dW/dr(l/9)dW/dr —(h1
-h)f(r),which is
positive.34 Thus, r* —rj*is ruled out. Also, r1* <rj*is impossible:
because rj* maximizes (l/D)W(r), this expression's value at r* cannot be
exceeded by its value at rj*;butthen the value of (l/9)W(r1) must be
greater at rj* than at rj* because the difference in the derivatives is
positive over the interval (rj*, r*1, which contradicts the optirnality of
rj*.
Second,we show that, if r* <rj*—*,thenh <h.To see this, assume
otherwise,that h >h.Consider first the case in which there Is more than
one type of act subject to *.Then,the derivative of welfare with respect
to both rj and rj in the interval (0, *j is given by expression (3.9), so the
argument demonstrating (3.10) establishes that r1* >rj*,a contradiction.
Now consider the case in which only act j is subject to *.Usingexpression
(3.11), observe that, at
(A.4) D[(h -r*)f(r*)
-cpof(r*)1>0,
because all the other terms in (3.11) are negative. This implies that
This result relies on our assumption that f(.) is independent of the type
of act. Otherwise, (3.10) might not hold, because inframarginal effects on
examination costs could be greater for the less harmful act.
-A4 -(AS) 8,,((h- r*)f(r0*)-cp0f(r*fl> 0,
because h> handr* <rj*.But then, from (3,9),dW/dr>0atr*,
because (A.S) is the first two components of (3.9) and all theother
components are also positive. This contradicts the optimality of r*.
Marginal Deterrence
Here we sketch the argument that our results extend to the case in which
individuals may choose among any of the ii harmful acts or not acting, except
that the first-order conditions determining the optimal rj must be modified.
First, the revelation principle still applies, because all individuals who
choose a given act will make the same report, the one that minimizes the
expected sanction. Second, the analysis of the incentive compatibility
constraints is unaffected, because the relevant arguments held expected
sanctions for each act constant. Thus, the ex post sanction for telling the
truth is zero and for lying is maximal; also, the ex ante sanction for those
not committing any harmful act is zero and the examination probabilities are
given by expression (3.7).








The integral is the benefit net of harm and examination costs for those who
commit harmful act i, where g(b) is the fraction of individuals who commit






This is because, for a person to choose act i, b -r1must exceed bJ -rjor,
equivalently, b must be less than rj +b
-rfor all j i. The second tern'
in (A.6) is examination costs for those who do not commit a harmful act (which
will be those for whom b < rt for all i).
























whichis the proportion of those who do not commit a harmful act among those
who are just deterred from committing act i.
dg1(b1)
(A.ll) •yj — dr db1,
j0, i,
rj
which is the proportion of those who commit act j among those who are just





whichis the average benefit from committing act i of individuals who are just
deterred from committing act i.
dg(b)
(A.l3) Bij —fbir1 db1, j '0,1.
rj
which is the average benefit from committing act j of individuals who are
induced to commit act j when just deterred from committing act I.
(A.14)C(r) —5 g(b1)db1,
-A6-so that 1C(r) represents the fraction of the population who commit act i
and report i.
The first two terms in brackets and the last term in (A.8) are analogous
to the three terms of (3.9). The third term In brackets in (A.8) is the
effect on welfare associated with individuals who, when deterred from
committing act I, are induced to commit other harmful acts j (in the model of
section 3, those who are deterred from committing i do not commit a harmful
act). This term thus involves for each j a difference in expected examination
costs, benefits from committing act j, and the harm caused by act j.
We now indicate why the r1* (except r0) are positive. Assume otherwise,
that r3* —0for some j0. Consider the change in welfare resulting from
raising each of the r except r0 by the same small amount. Because the r1
were optimal, the change in welfare from raising any positive r1 must be zero.
But the effect of raising r3 is positive, which contradicts the assumption
that the r1* were optimal. To see this, observe that the first term of dW/dr3
in (A.8) is positive because B3 equals zero. (All the r1 are increased by the
same amount, so the only individuals who commit different acts are those who
switch to act 0; at r3 —0,these will be individuals with benefits of zero.)
The second term is zero because, by (3.7), p3 —Po'The third term is zero
because no individuals switch to any acts except act 0. The fourth term is
positive.
Next, we show that the optimal r1 <increase with h1 by applying the
argument used to demonstrate (3.10) --thatis, we compare dW/dr1 and dW/dr3
for r1 —r3.Observe that, because the distributions of benefits for acts i
and j are the same, when r1 —r3considerations of symmetry imply the
following:o —a;g1(r1)— g3(r3); —fork #I,j — -y,; B
—
fork0, i, j; B13 —B;and B—B3.Also, from (3.7),p—p3.Thus, the
difference in marginal welfare is
dW dW (A.15) —- — — a1(h-h3)(l+ I j
which has the sign of h1 -h3.Hence, the argument demonstrating (3.10)
applies.
-A7-We can also show that only themostharmful acts will be subject to i,by
modifying the argument from section 3 in a manner analogous to that just
employed.
To demonstrate that r >0,we can use the same argument as in section 3.
This is because increasing all the rj (other than r0) by the same small amount
from zero has the same effects as before and no others, as no individuals are
led to switch among harmful acts.
Finally, the argument from section 3 establishing that any behavior that
results without self-reporting can be induced at lower cost with self-
reporting applies here without modification, for expected sanctions were held
constant in that argument. This implies that self-reporting is superior.
-AS-